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Questions on Islamic State - Part 1 بازديد: 2143

  نظر بدهيد  /   راي بدهيد  /   ارسال به دوستان  /   طرح سوال


Questions on Islamic State
Hamid-Reza Shakerin
Translated by:
Hussein Masoody
A Collection of Students' Queries
Political Thought (1)

Istituto rappresentante la Guida Suprema presso le Università
Segreteria per l’Istruzione e la Diffusione - Ufficio per la Consultazione e il Responso
Supervisione: Segreteria per l’Istruzione e la Diffusione - Ufficio per la Consultazione e il ResponsoAuthor: Hamid-Reza ShakerinTranslated by: Hussein Masoody
Editor:
First print: 2011
Printed by:
Tiratura:
ISBN: 978-964-531-312-6
Tutti i diritti sono riservati all’Editore
www.nashremaaref.ir
info@porseman.org

Index
Index I
The definition of Islamic State 1
• Question no. 1. What does Islamic State mean? Does it mean the governance of the pious people, the implementation of Islamic precepts, or the origination of all elements of government from religion? 1
The necessity and the goal of Islamic State 3
• Question No. 2. Why is Islamic State necessary after the departure of the Holy Prophet of Islam (PBUH)? 3
Society and Islamic State 5
• Question No. 3. Which one is important in an Islamic State: the realization of the religious society or the domination of the religious laws? Is the formation of a religious society possible only through Islamic State, or are there other ways as well? 5
The arguments of proponents and opponents of “Islamic State and religious politics” 7
• Question No. 4. What are the arguments presented by proponents of Islamic State among Muslim scholars? 7
• Question No. 5. If we regard religion as an individual affair and government as a social one, can we still conceive of Islamic State? 15
• Question No. 6. How is governance consistent with spiritual goals and otherworldliness? 16
Phases, varieties and structure of the Islamic State 25
• Question No. 7. What is the difference between Imamate and caliphate? What is the relationship between them? Are they mutually exclusive? 25
The advantages of Islamic State 29
• Question No. 8. What is the difference between Islamic State and non-religious or laic governments? Does Islamic State have any advantages over non-religious forms of government? 29
• Question No. 9. What is the difference between religious State in church’s view in Mediaeval Ages and in Islamic Republic of Iran and Shiite thought in the modern age? 37
The Muslim scholar’s Authority (Wilāyat-e Faqīh) 43
• Question No. 10. Is Islamic State possible just through the sovereignty of a grand Muslim scholar (Faqīh) or the clerics? 43
• Question No. 11. What evidences are there for Muslim scholar’s Authority? Was this idea posed also in the past? 44
• Question No. 12. What does the “absolute authority of the Muslim scholar” (“Wilāyat-e Mutlaqi-ye Faqīh) mean and how does it differ from the Muslim scholar’s Authority? How is the absolute authority of the Muslim scholar justified? Does it not culminate in autocracy and dictatorship? 47
• Question No. 13. How far is the scope of the Muslim scholars’ function in Islamic State? In case of conflicts between Muslim scholars’ views with that of the rulers, which one has priority over the other one? 49
• Question No. 14. What is the difference between the divine rulers’ prerogatives in Islamic State and those of the Prophet and Infallible Imams? 51
Legislation 55
• Question No. 15. Is jurisprudence enough for legislation in Islamic State? Or does it need the results of empirical and political sciences and other experiences of human societies? 55
• Question No. 16. What is the role of praxis, culture, and customs in legislation in Islamic State? 56
Jurisprudential and Scientific Management 65
• Question No. 17. What is the role of management in Islamic State? What is the role of jurisprudential and scientific managements in Islamic State? Which one plays a greater role? 65
• Question No. 18. What is the role of human achievements, scientific and social laws in Islamic State? 67
• Question No. 19. How much is the role of economics and new economic relations and laws acceptable in Islamic State? Are economic laws and relations effective in administrative methods of Islamic State? 68
• Question No. 20. What is the status of reason in Islamic State? 69
Islamic State and the Demands of the Time 71
• Question No. 21. In case of a contradiction between religious thought (texts and traditions) and Islamic State, which one has priority? Do necessities allow religious rulers to act against religious thought in case a necessity arises? 71
• Question No. 22. What are the fixed and changeable elements in Islamic State? Which parts of duties and functions of Islamic State are subject to change if the situation demands? 73
Legitimacy and Acceptability 75
• Question No. 23. What is the basis of legitimacy of governments in different schools? Compare them with the viewpoints of Islam and Shiism. 75
• Question No. 24. Is the Islamic State based on appointment by the Legislator or election by people? In the former case, can we believe in any role for people in affirmation or denial of the Islamic State? 85
• Question No. 25. What is the relationship between acceptability and legitimacy in Islamic State, particularly regarding the theory of the “Muslim scholar’s Authority”? 86
• Question No. 26. Supposing the ruler is appointed in Islamic State and people have no right in appointing or deposing him, how can we prevent Islamic State from leading to dictatorship? 90
• Question No. 27. Are people’s will and consent regarded as necessary conditions or elements in legitimacy [of the government]? 92
The Status of God and People in Islamic State 95
• Question No. 28. What are the roles of God’s consent and the faithful people’s consent in Islamic State? Which one has priority? 95
• Question No. 29. What is the role of people in policy-making and enforcing laws in Islamic State? What should we do in the case of a contradiction between people’s opinions and views and those of the rulers? 97
• Question No. 30. In case of establishment of the ideal form of the Islamic State through Imamate and caliphate, what is the role of allegiance in Islamic State? 98
• Question No. 31. What is the relationship between Islamic State and republicanism or democracy? Is Islamic State inconsistent with republican and democracy? 101
• Question No. 32. What are the mutual duties of people and Islamic State? 102
Islamic State and civil institutes 103
• Question No. 33. What are the most important issues concerning the relations of a government with the society and the civil institutes? What are the views of Islam and Constitution in this regard? 103
The Basic Rights and Personal Freedoms 105
• Question No. 34. To what extent are the public rights and people’s basic rights ensured in Islamic State? 105
• Question No. 35. To what extent are the personal and basic freedoms ensured? How much are these freedoms respected by Islamic State and rulers? 108
• Question No. 36. Are the State’s authority and jurisdictions not consistent with the personal freedoms? 109
Pathology and Controlling Power in Islamic State 111
• Question No. 37. How much do the Islamic ruler’s mistakes and faults negatively affect Islamic State and religion? What are the methods of their control and supervision? 111
• Question No. 38. Is the Islamic State not a kind of religious autocracy and dictatorship? 112
• Question No. 39. What are the ways for people to control the power and supervise the Islamic State? 115
• Question No. 40. How much is “enjoining good and forbidding evil” acceptable in Islamic State and by rulers in governmental affairs? 129
Detailed Index 131
Bibliography 135

The definition of Islamic State
Question no. 1. What does Islamic State mean? Does it mean the governance of the pious people, the implementation of Islamic precepts, or the origination of all elements of government from religion?
“Islamic State” is the government consistent with Islamic teachings and is based on religion, and at least, not inconsistent with Islamic doctrines in any way. To grasp the accurate meaning of the Islamic State, it is useful to pay attention to the following points:
First. No doubt, the rulers and the governors' piety is a necessity, but not enough without observing Islamic decrees and rules in formulation and implementation of the laws; for Islamic State means an “Islamic-oriented” regime. Therefore, commitment to the divine decrees is one of the essential and integral features of the Islamic State. The Holy Quran calls those violating this principle as infidels, stating that:
“wa man lam yahkum bi mā ’anzala Allāh[u] fa’ulā’ika hum-ul-kāfirūn” 1
(“Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers”)
Second. Based on the second view, employing religious norms and not opposing them is not enough to call a regime an Islamic State; the desired Islamic State is a regime whose all pillars and aspects are derived from Islam and consistent with it.
Referring to Islamic texts, we find that Islam does not accept every of government. It supports a government with the following features:
1. Its rulers enjoy qualifications and characteristics determined and defined in Islamic texts.
2. They accede to power through definite ways – divine designation and popular acceptability.
3. They follow the norms and methods defined in Islamic texts in their government.
Third: Islamic State has degrees and levels. The supreme and ideal level is realized when all its affairs and principles are based on Islam and in harmony with it; but when it is not possible to establish an all-out Islamic State, the lower levels are to be established.
The lower level or the compulsive substitute of Islamic State is the government wherein divine rules and ordinances are observed, even though the whole system is not derived from Islamic teachings and not headed by the ruler appointed by God. Surely, such a state is acceptable only if the establishment of a “perfect Islamic State” is not possible.2

The necessity and the goal of Islamic State
Question No. 2. Why is Islamic State necessary after the departure of the Holy Prophet of Islam (PBUH)?
Explaining this issue, Imam Khomeini said:3
1. Islamic decrees – including those pertaining to financial, political, legal, and so on – have not been abrogated and are indefeasible up to the Judgment Day and implementation of these decrees are impossible without establishment of a State government.
2. Establishing security and preserving social order are among accentuated Islamic obligations, just as disorder and insecurity in Islamic society is hated by the Holy Legislator, i.e. the Almighty God. It is obviously impossible to achieve this goal without establishing a government.
3. Protecting Muslims' frontiers against assault and invasion by transgressors is rationally and legally necessary, and this is one of the essential necessities of the Islamic society. Achieving this goal and actualizing it is impossible without having the necessary power and government.
4. Considering the above-mentioned premises, the existence of a Islamic State is a rational necessity and a religious obligation.
It is noteworthy that the mentioned “state” here refers to the Islamic State since based on what has been mentioned in number 1 above, (i.e.) the accurate implementation of Islamic decrees and rules in different aspects of social life is only realized in a state whose administrators and leaders are familiar with and aware of Islamic rules and decrees and they oblige themselves to practice them; Islamic laws are the basis for legislators and they do not enact any law contradicting them, not enacting any law contradicting those laws. The above mentioned reasoning may be put in another way too:
1. Comprehensiveness of Islamic Laws: Islam is a comprehensive religion and its decrees encompass various domains of political and social terms.
2. Viability and perpetuity of Islamic Laws: the divine laws and decrees of Islam are not restricted to the period of the Infallible Imams’ presence, but they are eternal and everlasting.
3. Implementation of the laws and the Islamic State: the enforcement of political and social rules of Islam is not possible without administrative offices and political-religious institutions. The Islamic State is, therefore, the prelude and the necessary pre-requisite of enforcing the divine laws.

Society and Islamic State
Question No. 3. Which one is important in an Islamic State: the realization of the religious society or the domination of the religious laws? Is the formation of a religious society possible only through Islamic State, or are there other ways as well?
The most comprehensive definition of the “religious society” is as follows: A religious society is one which 'believes in religion', is 'religion-oriented', 'judges based on religion, and is 'favored by religion'.4
Among the goals of Islamic State are protecting, preserving and elevating the Islamic society as well as enforcing the divine laws. More specifically, these two elements, i.e. “Islamic State” and “enforcing the [divine] laws”, are inseparable.
Establishing a government is not the ultimate goal and ideal; rather, it is an intermediary and instrumental factor in providing welfare, security, justice, development, felicity, and guidance for the society. The holy Quran points out that one of the agenda of the righteous government is the guidance of human beings towards God and His servitude – which is the only way for human's perfection. It states:
“Alladhīna in makkannāhum fi-l-ard[i] aqāmu-Salāt[a] wa ātu-Zakāt[a] wa amarū bi-l-ma'rūf[i] wa nahaw 'an-il-munkar[i] wa li-llāhi āqibat-ul-umūr[i]”5
(“Those who, if we give them power in land, establish worship and pay the poor due and enjoin kindness and forbid iniquity; and Allah’s is the sequel of the events.”)
Of course the instrumentality of the 'government' should not result in its underestimation, because the Islamic State is a key instrument and an essential one without which many objectives of religion will vanish or fade. Therefore, religious texts do stress “the righteous' religious authority and Imamate”, giving priority to preserving the religious regime over enforcing other subsidiary religious precepts. Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (PBUH) says:
(“Nothing has been emphasized on as religious authority in Islam.”)6
The arguments of proponents and opponents of “Islamic State and religious politics”
The arguments for Islamic State
Question No. 4. What are the arguments presented by proponents of Islamic State among Muslim scholars?
Muslim scholars generally consider a “righteous Islamic State” as necessary, and there are found no considerable divergences among them in this regard. The reasons provided by them are numerous and variegated. In other word, the reasons proving the necessity of the Islamic State in the time of Imam's presence also prove its necessity in time of occultation; what has been presented for the advantages of the Islamic State also attest to its rational preference. Besides, many transmitted arguments prove the necessity of a righteous Islamic State. These are divided into the following categories:
The First category. Some of these reasons are the definite transmitted ones such as Quranic verses asserting that authority, legislation and ruling belong to Almighty God, and rejecting any other law, government or lordship inconsistent with divine law. Some of them are the following verses:
1. Verses restricting the right to governance, legislation, judgment and lordship to God, such as the following verse:
“..in il-hukmu illā li-llāh[i]; amara an-lā ta'budū illā iyyāh[u], zālika ad-dīn ul-qayyim[u] wa lākin akthar an-nāsi lā ya'lamūn[a].”7
(“…the decision rests with Allah only who has commanded you that you worship none save Him; this is the right religion but most men know not.”)
2. Verses which assert that leadership and Imamate are divine trusts; such as the following verse:
“wa idh-ibtalā Ibrāhīma rabbahū bi kalimātin fa atammahunna qāla innī ja'iluka li-nāsi imāmā, qāla wa min dhurrīyatī, qāla lā yanālu ahdīy al-zālimīn[a].”8
(“And [remember] when his Lord tried Abraham with [His] commands, and he fulfilled them; He said: Lo I have appointed thee a leader for mankind. [Abraham] said: and of my offspring [will there be leaders]? He said: my covenant includeth not wrong-doers.”)
3. Verses regarding the divine law and ordinance as the foremost one. Such as:
“wa man’ahsanu min-Allahi hukman li qawmin yūqinūn[a].”9
(“Who is better than Allah for judgment to the people who have certainty [in their belief]?”)
4. Verses that describe any judgment not based on divine law as infidelity, vicious conduct and injustice; such as:
“wa man lam yahkum bi-mā ’anzala-Allah[u] fa’ulā'ika hum-ul kāfirūn[a].”10
(“Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed: such are disbelievers.”)
5. Verses negate seeking judgment, following and accepting the sovereignty of the following groups based on a corresponding or implied indication:
a) Illegitimate ruler:
“yurīdūna ‘an yatahākamū ila-at-tāghūti wa qad umirū ‘an yakfurū bih[ī].”11
(“…they would go for judgment [in their disputes] to false deities when they have been ordered to abjure them.”)
b) Infidels:
“wa lan yaj'ala-Allah[u] li-l kafirīna 'ala-l mu'minīna sabīlā”12
(“…and Allah will not give the disbelievers any way [of success] against the believers.”)
c) Evil-doers:
“a fa man kāna muminan ka man kāna fāsiqā, lā yastawūn”13
(“Is he who is a believer like unto him who is an evil-liver? They are not alike.”)
d) The oppressive:
“wa lā tarkanū’il-alladhīna zalamū fa tamassakum u-nār[u] wa mā lakum min dūni-llāhi min awliyā'a thumma lā tunsarūn[a].”14
(“And incline not toward those who do wrong lest the [hell] fire touches you, and you have not protecting friends against Allah, and afterwards you would not be helped.”)
e) Sinners and the ungrateful:
“fa-sbir li hukmi rabbika wa lā tuti' minhum āthiman aw kafūrā.”15
(“So submit patiently to thy Lord's command, and obey not of them any guilty one or disbeliever.”)
f) The foolish:
“wa lā tu'tu al-sufahā'a amwālakum-ullatī ja'ala-Allāhu lakum qiyāmā.”16
(“Give not unto the foolish [what is in] your [keeping of their] wealth which Allah hath given you to maintain [your life]...”)
g, h) The prodigal and the corruptors:
“wa lā tutī'ū amr al-mufsidīn[a],’alladhīna yufsidūna fi-l-ardi wa lā yuslihūn.”17
(“And do not obey the command of the prodigal; [those] who spread corruption in the earth and reform not.”)
i, j) The negligent and the capricious:
wa lā tuti' man aghfalnā qalbahū 'an zikrinā wat-taba'a hawāhu wa kāna amruhū furutā.”18
(“…and obey not him whose heart we have made heedless of our remembrance, who followeth his own lust, and whose case hath been abandoned.”)
k) They who consider their evil deeds as good deeds:
“…a fa man kāna ‘alā bayyinatin min rabbihī ka man zuyyina lahū su'u 'amalihī wat-taba'ū ahwā'ahum.”19
(“Is he who relieth on a clear proof from his Lord like those for whom the evil that they do is beautified while they follow their own lust?”)
l) The ignorant:
“qul hal yastawi-lladhīna ya'lamūna wa-lladhīna lā ya'lamūn[a], innamā yatazakkaru ulul-albāb.”20
(“Say [unto them, O Muhammad!]: are those who know equal with those who know not? But only men of understanding will pay heed”.)
The Second category. Some of the arguments consist of verses including a specific reference to the Prophet's or some other religious authorities' leadership, such as:
“qul atī'u-llāh wa atī'u-r-Rasūl…”21
(“Say obey Allah and obey the Messenger…”)
The Third category. Some arguments include verses or traditions describing the characteristics and qualifications of government agents and their duties. The duties mentioned therein are only consistent with Islamic State and ruling of the pious politicians who are knowledgeable about religious decrees and believe in their enforcement. These verses – through a corresponding or implied indication – assert the following qualifications to be necessary or useful for the leader:
1. Power and capacity. The Holy Quran asserts, regarding the reason for giving the sovereignty to Tālūt, that:
“inn-Allāha-stafāhu 'alaykum wa zādahū bastatan fil-ilmi wal-jism[i] wa-llāhu yu'tī mulkahū man yashā'u wa-llāhu vāsi'un 'alīm[un].”22
(“…Lo Allah hath chosen him above you, and hath increased him abundantly in wisdom and stature. Allah bestoweth his sovereignty on whom He will. Allah is All-embracing, All-knowing.”)
2. Trustiness and commitment. The prophet Joseph describes himself as knowledgeable and trustworthy when accepting the charge of the treasury – a governmental responsibility:
“qāla-j'alnī alā khazāini-l-ard innī hafīzun 'alīm[un].”23
(“He said: set me over the storehouses of the land; Lo, I'm a skilled custodian.”)
3. Knowledge. The above-mentioned verses attest to this qualification as well.
4. Justice. Here, the Holy Quran uses a rhetoric question:
“…hal yastavī huwa wa man ya’muru bil-adl wa huwa alā sirātin mustaqīm.”24
(“…is he equal with one who enjoineth justice and followeth a straight path [of conduct]?)
5. Being in the right path. The previous verse attests to this qualification.
6. Insight and following divine revelation.
“qul hal yastavi-l-a'mā wa-l-basīr[u], a fa lā tatafakkarūn[a]”25
(“…say are the blind man and the seer equal? Will you not then take thought?”
7. Being guided and a guide.
“…a fa man yahdī ila-l-haqqi ahaqqu ‘an yuttaba'a am-man lā yahdī illā ‘an yuhdā fa mā lakum kayfa tahkumūn[a]”26
(“…is he who leadeth to the truth more deserving that he should be followed or he who findeth not the way unless he [himself] be guided? What aileth you? How do you judge? “)
8. Faith.
“a fa man kāna muminan ka man kāna fāsiqan lā yastawūn[a]”27
(“Is he who is a believer like unto him who is an evil-liver? They are not alike.”). This verse contains a rhetoric question and negates the equality of a believer with a disbeliever to prove the believer's priority in different ways, including lordship.
The Fourth category. Another group of the reasons presented include the social decrees of Islam whose enforcement is impossible without establishment of Islamic State. This series of Islamic decrees are very extensive and heavily outnumber the individual ritual decrees.28
Another group of reasons include the way of life of the Impeccable in establishing Islamic State when it was possible.29
Finally, it is noteworthy that religious scholars have adduced the Four Proofs (the Book, practice, unanimity and reason) in this regard.
In view of what has been said, the necessity of Islamic State in Islamic society is unanimously acknowledged by all Muslims – Shiite and Sunni.


Question No. 5. If we regard religion as an individual affair and government as a social one, can we still conceive of Islamic State?
This idea belongs to John Locke's view of separating the realms of religion and politics;30 it is one of the theoretical bases of political secularism. This idea, however, is challenged by the following objections:
First. There is no accurate, universal and proper demarcation between individual and social affairs.
Second. Restricting religion to “individual affairs” may be consistent with a religion devoid of divine laws (or Sharīa); however, it is never consistent with the reality of the comprehensive religion of Islam, especially as the growth and development of Islam was concomitant with the policy and government established by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) since his arrival in Medina. As Hamilton A.R. Gibb writes, the early Christian society was, in principle, subject to a non-religious and traditional power when it emerged so that it suddenly found itself in a situation not prepared for….Islam, however, has grown up in a world whose political organization was established by Islam itself.31
Third. Even in the western world – which is the cradle of secularism, wherein the common religion lacks a comprehensive religious law – secularism and the separation of religion from politics and society is declining, with the religion's influence gradually strengthening in this sphere. This shows the impossibility of a complete separation between religion and politics.32


Question No. 6. How is governance consistent with spiritual goals and otherworldliness?
To answer this question, some points are referred to briefly:
1. The Holy Quran mentions both otherworldly and worldly goals for the prophets' mission, such as establishing just social relations, attempting to make human beings free from slavery and subjugation to others. The goals mentioned by the Holy Quran for prophetic mission are as follows:
1.1. reciting and mentioning the divine verses;33
1.2. purifying human soul;34
1.3. teaching the Book and wisdom;35
1.4. God's Unity and worshipping Him;36
1.5. disgusting illegitimate rulers;37
1.6. establishing social justice;38
1.7. judging and ruling among human beings based on justice;39
1.8. releasing human being from chains of slavery;40
1.9. enjoining good and forbidding evil;41
The martyred scholar, Murteza Mutahhari, writes: “Since the time of the prophet Noah, every prophet who came to change the existing religious order has attended to the social order as well, trying to reform it”.42
He then refers to the following verse:
“la qad arsalnā rusulanā bil-bayyināti wa anzalnā ma'ahum al-kitāba wal-mīzāna li-yaqūm al-nāsa bil-qist.”43
(“We verily sent our messengers with clear proofs and revealed with them the Scripture and the Criterion to establish justice among people.”)
and writes: “[this] means that disturbing an existing corrupt order and establishing a just ideal order has been the objective for all prophetic missions, but this is more distinct and definite in Islam”.44
Therefore, the strict stress of the religious texts on hereafter does not contradict dealing with the worldly affairs – providing that it is not inconsistent with human's felicity in the hereafter. Worldly government as a final goal has no value at all; but it is much favorite and desirable for establishing justice and dominance of the religious values. Amir al-Mumenin, Imam Ali (PBUH), says:
“I swear by God! This worn-out pair of shoes is, in my view, more valuable than governing you unless I can protect the truth or eliminate falsehood.”45
2. According to religious texts, the world and the hereafter are closely related, and it is much rejected to engage in one of them and leave the other. So while we find that the world has been reproved in some verses, we find elsewhere that those verses refer to secularism, attachment to the world, and negligence in remembering God and the hereafter. Engaging in the necessary worldly affairs, reforming or improving them, and setting proper personal and social relations are not reproved; rather, they have been emphasized by religion and lead to felicity in the hereafter as well. In a tradition transmitted from Imam Sajjad (PBUH), it has been stated that:
“The world is of two kinds: one leads us to the hereafter, and the other is the cursed one [preventing us from engaging in otherworldly affairs]”.46 In another tradition, Imam Ali (PBUH) says: “The hereafter is acquired through this world”.47
3. Government is one of the most important necessities of human’s social life, without which life would be impossible. In case there is no righteous government, the society would be tangled in an unrighteous government; as Imam Ali (PBUH) says:
“There is no way out for people under a righteous or unrighteous ruler”.48
On the other hand, the Holy Quran has emphatically prohibited following the unrighteous and non-divine rulers and regimes. So there is no way to elude establishing a “righteous government”; otherwise, the society would be tangled in anarchy. Some of the verses denoting the necessity of the government of knowledgeable and competent righteous people were mentioned previously.
4. From a Quranic viewpoint, government has a religious basis. The Quranic verses explicitly declare that establishing a government, legislation, and judgment all belong exclusively to God and those who have received permission from God; any judgment and ruling not based on divine laws is infidelity, viciousness and injustice.
5. A short survey of Shiite Imams’ way of life clearly shows that a great part of their life consists of political and social activities.49 In some cases, these efforts have not culminated in establishing a government and the complete seizure of political power. The mystery generally lies in lack of necessary conditions and the lack of cooperation on the part of the society.50 Imam Ali says, on the event after the Prophet’s departure, that:
“…then I came with Fatima, and my two sons, Hassan and Hussein, to the men of Badr and the outstrippers in Islam. I put forward my arguments on my right to caliphate, calling for their assistance. None of them granted my request except four. They were Salman, Ammar, Miqdad and Abuzar”.51
Sayings of other infallible Imams to the effect that establishing a government is their own right accorded to them by God, and no one shares this right with them, are completely expressive and explicit.52 Regarding this issue, they have frequently referred to Qadir incident, basing their arguments on it.53 Imam Ali (PBUH) says regarding the Prophet’s Household:
“They are the repository of God’s mysteries and the club of His ordinances. They are the treasury of God’s knowledge and the referee of His decrees. They are the shelter for God’s Book and the strong mountains for His religion. Through them God straightened the hunchback of the religion, removing the shakings of its entity”.54 Then Imam Ali referred to the oppression inflicted upon them, saying that: “they diffused the seeds of impiety, and watered them with pride and deception, harvesting its crop which was all misery and obliteration. Verily none of them are comparable to the Prophet’s progeny, and those who are feeding upon Muhammad’s progeny can not be equal to them. They are the pillars of religion and faith…. The valuable features of government belong to them, and the Prophet’s will and legacy exist among them. Nonetheless, when the right went to its owners, it returned to the first place once more!”55
Elsewhere, Imam Ali says:
“I found that tolerance and patience is closer to wisdom, so I exercised patience, but I was like someone whose eyes are full of pickles and has a piece of bone in his throat. I was beholding that my legacy was being plundered. The first caliph died and reposed caliphate to someone else.”56
Another point deserving attention is that Islamic State is not, in principle, inflictive and compulsory; thus it is not realizable without support from people. Therefore, Imam Ali’s assuming power after people’s paying homage to him does not contradict his divine right; rather, it is closely related to the divine and popular nature of the Islamic State.57 As for Imam Hassan’s signing the peace treaty with Mu’awia, the plentiful historical evidences show that Imam had no better choice because the society did not accompany him.58
Imam Hussein’s decision to return home in his way to Kufa after they breached their allegiance was an ultimatum for the enemy, since the conditions were no longer good for struggle and uprising there. Therefore, Imam had no other choice except changing his plans and setting out in another direction. This is, however, no sign of his submission to the unjust rulers of his time and leaving his uprising and struggle against them. He persevered up to the end of his life and sacrificed all beloved member of his family for the sacred goal of Islam, not stopping his struggle even for a moment.
Imam Sadiq rejected Abu Muslim Khorasani’s request, for his rising lacked the conditions of an Islamic struggle and was not consistent with religious goals; so Imam could not endorse such a rising.59
Imam Reza refused to be Mamun’s vicegerent for many reasons, including the following reasons: firstly, Mamun’s offer – as Imam himself affirmed – was a mere pretense void of reality. Secondly, Imam’s giving his assent to Mamun’s offer would mean legitimizing his government and breaking down the political philosophy of Shiite and the basis of divine Imamate. Imam’s rejection was thus the most intelligent way of frustrating Mamun’s plot.60

Phases, varieties and structure of the Islamic State
Imamate and caliphate

Question No. 7. What is the difference between Imamate and caliphate? What is the relationship between them? Are they mutually exclusive?
If we consider the literary meaning of “Imamate” and “caliphate”, there is no contradiction between them, and Imam is also called caliph. But if we consider the content of the two trends and the two types of leadership as two doctrines originated in Islamic society, measuring them through the criteria set in religious texts, we will clearly find out that the government approved by religion is the very “Imamate and Wilāyat” system. There are plentiful evidences for this, including:
1. The Quranic evidences to the effect that Imamate is a divine covenant, belonging just to those with special qualifications:

“wa idh-ibtalā Ibrāhīma rabbahū bi kalimātin fa atammahunna qāla innī ja'iluka li-nāsi imāmā, qāla wa min dhurrīyatī, qāla lā yanālu ahdīy al-zālimīn[a].”61
(“And [remember] when his Lord tried Abraham with [His] commands, and he fulfilled them; He said: Lo I have appointed thee a leader for mankind. [Abraham] said: and of my offspring [will there be leaders]? He said: my covenant includeth not wrong-doers [and only those of your scions who are infallible would deserve this position.”)
2. The traditional evidences to the effect that Imamate and leadership do exclusively belong to Infallible Imams of the Prophet’s progeny. These evidences are plentiful and consecutive. Interestingly, most of these texts are also found in Sunni collections of traditions. The following traditions are examples of this kind:
The holy Prophet said: “this community’s affairs will be set in order as long as twelve caliphs, all from Quraish, govern them”.62
In another tradition, it is said: “this community’s affairs will be orderly as long as twelve men govern them”.63
There are many traditions similar to these ones in both Shiite and Sunni collections. Other traditions have also been transmitted interpreting these traditions, such as the one transmitted by Imam Juwaini (Imam al-Haramayn) on the authority of Ibn Abbass from the Prophet:
“I am the lord of the prophets, and Ali bin Abi Talib is the lord of the Awsīa (the trustees). Verily my trustees are twelve whose first one is Ali bin Abi Talib, and the last one is Mahdi”.64
3. The arguments for “The Muslim scholar’s Authority” (Wilāyat-e Faqīh) in the Occultation period, which deserve to be studied independently.

The advantages of Islamic State
Question No. 8. What is the difference between Islamic State and non-religious or laic governments? Does Islamic State have any advantages over non-religious forms of government?
While religious and non-religious forms of government have some similarities, they are different from several aspects. Some of these differences areas follows:
1. Difference in goals. Non-religious regimes – including democratic, monarchy, and oligarchy forms – are in one sense minimal governments.65 In other words, their most basic goal is fulfilling the worldly wants or needs of the society and the citizens and do not have any goal above it; but a religious regime pursues two goals: fulfilling the worldly needs as well as the otherworldly and eternal needs.
The goals of the Islamic State: the most important philosophy and goal of establishing an Islamic government are as follows:
a) Establishing divinity and belief in God’s Unity on the earth and releasing people from servitude and following all other than God:
“wa la qad b‘athnā fī kulli’ummatin rasūlan ‘an i’bidu-Allāha wa-jtanibut-tāghūt[a]…”.66
b) The scientific, cultural and educational growth and uplift of human beings, making them free from ignorance and imbecility:
“huwa-lladhī ba’atha fi-l-ummīyyīna rasūlan minhum yatlū ‘alaihim āyātihī wa yuzakkīhim wa yu‘allimuhum ul-kitāba wal-hikma, wa’in kānū min qablu la fī zalālin mubīn[in]”.67
c) Releasing masses of people in general and the oppressed in particular from oppressive rulers and chains of servitude:
“wa yada’u ‘anhum israhum wal-aghlāl-allatī kānat ‘alaihim…”.68
d) Establishing a good society and ideal utopia by establishing Islamic justice:
“la qad arsalnā rusulan bil-bayyināti wa anzalnā ma‘ahum ul-kitāba wal-mīzāna li-yaqūm al-nās bil-qist…”.69
e) Complete enforcement of celestial laws of Islam with all its dimensions (including economic, legal, social, political, military,…dimensions).
2. Difference in the government’s functions. The duties and functions of non-religious regimes are as minimal as their goals; that is their most essential duty is providing health, education and security. With the failure of minimal government, “welfare state” was put forward and providing welfare and development came to be known as the government’s duties. Besides, in equalitarian regimes, establishment of social justice is also known as one of the government’s functions. Anyway, none of these governments have subsumed the effort to prepare the ground for growth and perfection of human virtues and his eternal felicity within their agenda.
In contrast, the Islamic State assumes much more responsibilities; that is, in addition to providing the above-mentioned services, it must endeavor to work out appropriate plans for religious and spiritual training of the society, developing high human virtues, and promoting piety. It must lead the society towards everlasting felicity and struggle with the factors of the fall and liquidation of human’s real personality and the obstacles in the way of humanity’s growth and perfection.
The Holy Quran depicts the spiritual figure of the righteous government:
“alladhīna’in makkannāhum fil-ard aqāmu-Salāta wa ātu-z-zakāta wa amarū bil-ma'rūfi wa nahaw 'an-il-munkari wa li-llāhi āqibat-ul-umūr[i]”70
(“Those who, if we give them power in land, establish worship and pay the poor due and enjoin kindness and forbid iniquity; and Allah’s is the sequel of the events.”)
3. Difference in methods. The difference in the goal and functions of the religious and non-Islamic States will be effective also in choosing the methods and values.
In regimes with no concern for religion, planning will be void of consideration for eternal and fundamental values and principles of religion. The final authority in such regimes would be the instrumental reason. Indifference towards values would cause the idea of “the goal justifies the means” to be the dominant principle, ignoring the moral ideals and principles; unless the dominant culture of the society imposes special values and does not tolerate any defiance of them.
4. Difference in the source of legislation. In non-religious regimes, the origin of law is nothing other than the desires, wants, worldly interests, and transient attitudes of human beings. In contrast, the “Islamic State” is based on the principle of God’s Unity. The main origin of law in this attitude is only God; He who is the creator, the owner and the Lord of the man. Thus, from the viewpoint of the philosophy of religious rights, it is only God who has the right to decide in human affairs. Besides, He is more knowledgeable about the good and evil of the man and leads them to the best way of achieving eternal goodness and felicity. Therefore, just one law is legitimate, i.e. the law enacted by God or by those permitted by Him to do so, and this is the law completely consistent with the principles and rules accepted by the Holy Legislator. Evidently, the sources of legislation in such a system are mainly discovery and inferences of the divine law and adjusting them to the needs of the time.
5. Difference in the rulers and the agents. In laic and secular regimes, no qualification other than the relative competence of social management is necessary for a leader. In Islamic regime, however, the qualifications of the leader – including the specific principles as well as the common principles shared by other political views – are as follows:
A. Scientific qualification: the so-called “Fiqāhat” which means the accurate recognition of the legal and jurisprudential decrees of Islam in all aspects of social and individual affairs, because it is presumed that what is set as the criterion for action and legislation is the very divine law. Having a leader capable of inferring divine decrees in major social affairs, finding religious decrees in different issues, and enforcing them seems necessary for the community. Scientific qualification discussed here is divided into two parts:
1. Necessary awareness of the ongoing situation and the needs of the society, and the ways for directing the society towards fulfilling those needs and overcoming the problems. This awareness is necessary for any leader in any regime and without it the administration of the society faces serious problems.
2. A deep and sufficient awareness of Islamic doctrines and the ability to infer divine laws and apply them in major and minor matters in consonance with the requirements of the time. This characteristic is an exclusive requirement of the Islamic State, for the main goal in this kind of government is the dominance of divine values, norms and laws, and realizing this is impossible without an Islamicist insightful leader competent in inferring divine laws in all arenas of the social needs.
B. The management competence: knowledge and awareness is a necessary – but not sufficient –condition for the macro-level and micro-level managements. In the area of management, some features are not simply attainable by acquiring specific knowledge and skills; these are: the ability to decide on time, especially in times of crisis; taking initiative for getting out of dead ends; innovation and the ability to cause growth and development; and not losing opportunities while avoiding haste. Rather, these features depend on the person’s psychological qualities, intelligence, tact and policy, maturity in facing various problems and difficulties, and mental promptitude.
This kind of qualification is not restricted to the management of the Islamic society; rather, management in any society and in any organizational rank necessitates these qualifications. It has been said that “management is partly knowledge and partly technique and art”.
C. Moral qualification. In Islam, the moral qualification of the leader of the Muslim community, his justice, piety, chastity, trustworthiness, braveness, non-selfishness, and his avoiding whim, ambition and other moral vices have been much emphasized. This is of importance from several aspects:
1) Since the ruler of the Islamic community must establish justice and enforce divine laws, he himself must follow them wholeheartedly and be completely committed to religious norms by heart and in practice. Imam Hussein (PBUH) says:
“the leads of the affairs and rules must be in the hands of those theist scholars who are trustworthy and devoted in observing what is licit and what is illicit in divine laws”.71
2) The leader of the Islamic community is responsible for both administrating community and religious instructing and training of its members. Therefore, he himself must enjoy moral virtues and Islamic etiquette, and avoid making mistakes and erroneous behaviors so that he can direct others to perfection and prevent them from moral impairments. Imam Ali says: “Someone who sets himself a leader for people should begin with instructing himself before instructing others”.72
3) From viewpoint of sociology and educative psychology, the rulers and the prominent figures of any society automatically function as a model for a large section of the society, their behavior and way of life seriously affect the people and their behaviors. This effect is so great that the Prophet says:
“the people follow the same religion as their rulers”.73
Here, it must be noted that the ideal and ultimate point of these features is “Infallibility”. Thus, in first place, the Islamic society must be administered by the infallible (Prophet or Imam), and in the Occultation period, someone who is closest to the infallible Imam – as far as the above mentioned qualities are concerned – takes on the leadership as Imam’s deputy. Such a person is called “Walīy-e Faqīh” (“Authoritative Muslim scholar”). Thus it has been stated in article five of the Constitutional Law of IRI that: “In Occultation period, the authority and the leadership of the community is taken on by a just and pious Muslim scholar who is aware of the time and is a brave and tactful director”.
From what we have stated up to now, several basic advantages of religious (Islamic) government over non-religious and laic governments are clarified:
1. Islamic State concerns itself about eternal felicity of human beings and thus, in addition to playing the role played by other governments, is active in preparing the ground for human’s growth and sublimation as well.
2. Islamic State is a law-abiding government, relying on the purely divine laws.
3. Islamic State is administered by righteous rulers, thus enjoying a high immunity to the risks of autocracy and corruption of power.
 

The church’s sovereignty
Question No. 9. What is the difference between religious State in church’s view in Mediaeval Ages and in Islamic Republic of Iran and Shiite thought in the modern age?
There are major differences between “Theocracy” – called erroneously the church’s sovereignty – and Islamic government or Islamic Republic regime. To clarify this point, the following points are mentioned:
First. In the prevailing Christian thought, religion is essentially separated from government and politics, because:
a. Christianity lacks a religious law and coherent and comprehensive instructions on human’s political and social life, and the Christian teachings on social relations go no more than some moral instructions.
b. Some of the Bible’s teachings throughout history have propagandized the idea of separation of religion and politics. It is stated in the Bible that Jesus Christ said to Pilatus: “My kingdom is not of this world…”74 He also said to Herodians: “Give Caesar's property back to Caesar; give God what belongs to God.”75
Accordingly, the seed of the secularist idea of separation of religion and politics can be said to have its roots in the popular Christian thought. By Christianity, of course, we mean the Church religion, not the true teachings of the prophet Jesus (PBUH). The Church thus has essentially no claims – as it did not in the past – with regard to government and administration of social affairs on the basis of revelation and religious law. The Church’s authority and jurisdiction in some of the social affairs (such as education, judgment, and the like) does neither mean church’s sovereignty in all political and social elements, nor religious interference in such affairs. Government has always been in the hands of the kings. Here, the king’s sovereignty was called the God’s sovereignty over people (“Theocracy”), since they believed that the king obtains his legitimacy from God and is held accountable just to Him.
Therefore, God’s sovereignty over people (theocracy) in western thought has never meant the sovereignty of religion and divine laws, while the Islamic regime is a completely religious regime whose origin, goals, laws and the qualifications of its rulers and agents as well as the social relations therein are deeply rooted in religion. Here, religion is the founder of a special civilization and society, unlike Christian society which was the inheritor of the Roman civilization, having no choice other than accepting that civilization and accommodating itself to it.76
Second. In the mediaeval theocracy, the dominant motto was: “the ruler is accountable only to God, not to people”. This God has neither assigned any requirements for the king nor issued any agenda for his government. James I, the king of the Britain – one of the theorists of this idea – has been quoted to say that the kings are the aspirating images of God on the earth. Just as it is profane and atheistic to argue what God can do and what He should not do, it is also profane and atheistic for the subjects to argue what the king can say or do and what he can not do. Why? For not only the kings are the vicegerents of God on the earth and sit on the God’s throne, but also they have even been called gods by God Himself”.77
Such a mentality would cause the “power” not to be controlled by religious institutions nor by social and civil ones. Consequently, it would lead to the corruption of the government and abuse of power.
As Luther points out, “no Christian can oppose a ruler – whether good or bad – rather he should submit to any unjust ruler. Anyone who resists, will be cursed”78 Altogether, the principles governing this doctrine are as follows:
1. The monarchy has been established by God, and the monarch gets his sovereignty from God;
2. Monarchy is hereditary and this ancestral right is bequeathed to the son by his father;
3. The monarch is only accountable to God, not to his own subjects;
4. Resisting the monarch and his ordinances is considered to be a sin.79
In Islam, however, the situation is quite different. In Islamic government, the ruler is accountable to God and the society as well. Besides, the Holy Quran does not regard criticizing the corrupt powers as a cause for heresy; rather, it regards this as a religious obligation and says: “Do not obey the commands of the unjust leader, who spread corruption in the earth and do not reform [the people’s affairs]”.80 The relation of State-nation in Islam is based on mutual rights; but in western theocracy, the king has the “right” over the people, and people have “duties” before the king.
Third. In the period of the mediaeval feudalism, the Church was one of the most important feudalist centers and owned many estates.81 Secularity and luxury had dominated the Church and living in palaces actually culminated in abolishment of the spiritual teachings of the church. This grave phenomenon led the church to accompany those who owned wealth and power, justify the corrupt regimes, distancing itself from “justice and fighting oppression” – which is the dominant spirit of divine religions.
In Islamic society, one of the most important qualifications of the religious and state leaders is their liberality and freedom from worldly desires. The Infallible religious leaders’ way of life – such as Imam Ali (PBUH) – is one of the most prominent examples of this quality throughout history. Similarly, Imam Khomeini’s simple and unworldly way of life, while he was at the apogee of the power, is also one salient example of this.
Ernest Cardinale, the Christian priest and the minister of education in revolutionary government of Nicaragua (Sandenists) writes [in his memories]:
After the Nicaragua’s revolution, we were severely under economic siege, and sugar cane – the most important income source for our country – was not bought from us. We were in a very difficult and vague situation. In a journey to Iran, I went to Iranian leader. I passed through circuitous lanes of Jamaran. The leader’s house was in quite simplicity and austerity. The person who had shaken the east and the west was an old man with simple clothes in a humble room. He simply said: “we are beside the combatants against oppressors”. This was a morale support to which nothing is comparable.
Continuing my journey, I went to Pope’s abode in Vatican. That was a galleried palace and magnificent abode, with Pope having expensive and dressy clothes who said with a scathing and bitter tone: “If you want to have the Church’s support, you mustn’t have anything to do with politics, and mustn’t struggle with US”.
I replied: “You must be my leader, but you are not! My leader is Imam Khomeini who lives in quite simplicity and really follows Jesus Christ; he is the enemy of US. If Jesus was here, he would behave like Imam Khomeini”.82
Islam and the State
What was stated shows that there is essentially nothing in Christianity called “theocratical state”, and the western and Christian “theocracy” never means “theocratical state”; in Islam, however, the case is quite different, because:
a. “Religion” and “politics” are deeply and closely linked to one another;
b. Islam has special agenda in all domains related to the State. The following are the most important ones:
1. Defining the ruler’s qualifications;
2. Regulating the domestic and foreign policy;
3. Defining the mutual rights and obligations of the society and the State;
4. Regulating the mechanism of power control and preventing corruption;
5. Enforcing and increasing public participation;
6. Stating the basis for [the State’s] legitimacy;
7. Expressing the ways of creating, preserving and exercising the power.83

The Muslim scholar’s Authority (Wilāyat-e Faqīh)
Question No. 10. Is Islamic State possible just through the sovereignty of a grand Muslim scholar (Faqīh) or the clerics?
Islamic State is principally exercised through leadership by the Impeccable; the starting point for this government has been the great Prophet’s “Imamate and Leadership” and then that of Imams from the Prophet’s Household. In the Occultation period, the Authoritative Muslim scholar (“Walīy-e Faqīh”), i.e. the person with all necessary qualifications for issuing legal decrees (fatwā or the religious decrees pronounced by a Muslim scholar) and the leadership of the society, is appointed as the leader of the Islamic community by Impeccable Imams, and when he enjoys necessary qualifications, it is incumbent upon him to take on the “leadership” of the community as the vicegerent of Impeccable Imams.
Therefore, in the Occultation period, Islamic State is nonsense without “The Muslim scholar’s Authority”. The philosophy of this principle is clarified by exploring the features of the Islamic State and the necessary qualifications of the rulers in Islam. In other words, all affairs in the Islamic State are to be regulated based on the divine laws and decrees. The presence of a knowledgeable and competent leader, capable of discerning divine decrees, accommodating them with the needs of the time, and committing himself to the religious norms, is thus self-evident. Therefore, it is stated in a tradition by Imam Ali (PBUH): “Among people, one who is more potent and more knowledgeable about divine decrees is more qualified for leadership”84
 

The evidence for Muslim scholar’s Authority
Question No. 11. What evidences are there for Muslim scholar’s Authority? Was this idea posed also in the past?
The idea of “Muslim scholar’s Authority” – whether theoretically or practically – has the same long history as shi’ism. Malik Ashtar’s appointment to governorship of Egypt by Imam Ali (PBUH) is a salient example of this. In Shiite jurisprudence, prominent Muslim scholars have posed this idea in different ways. Among these brilliant figures in Shiite jurisprudence are Sheikh Mufīd, Muhaqqiq Karaki, Allāma Narāqi, Sahib Jawāhir (the author of Jawāhir al-Kalām); among the contemporary figures, Imam Khomeini was the greatest revival of this idea both in theory and in practice.
Imam Khomeni believed that the idea of “Wilāyat-e Faqīh” is so axiomatic and self-evident that correct understanding of which will immediately lead to affirming it. Sorrily, because of a centuries-long gap between clerics and politics, due to the dominance of usurping rulers and propagandas against religion by enemies, we need now to present arguments in favor of this idea. Nevertheless, religious scholars have always argued for it, fortifying its bases; Narāqi, for instance, presented nineteen transmitted evidences for it in his ‘Awā’id al-ayyām. Altogether, the evidences which may be adduced for Wilāyat-e Faqīh are divided into three categories:
First. The merely rational evidences: the evidences therein all minor and major premises are rational;
Second. The merely transmitted evidences: the evidences all inferred from Islamic texts, i.e. Quran and the Sunna.
Third. The combined evidences: a combination of rational and transmitted evidences.
Each of these categories has numerous statements and documents of its own. Here, some of the combined evidences are mentioned:
1. The nature of Islam. Islam is a comprehensive religion encompassing all dimensions of human life – including personal, social, worldly and otherworldly affairs.85
2. The eternality of Islam. Islam is an eternal religion, whose decrees remain in force up to the Judgment Day; “…halālu Muhammad halāun ilā yawmi-l-qīyāma wa…”86
3. The necessity of Islamic State. The enforcement of political, social and legal rules of Islam is impossible without establishing a Islamic State.
4. The necessity of continuation of Islamic State. The eternality of religious decrees and the need for an Islamic political regime for enforcing them results in the necessity of its existence forever.
5. The nature of Islamic State. Islamic State is, by nature, a government wherein religious laws and norms are the criteria for action.
6. The requirements for the ruler. In view of the legal nature of the Islamic State, the ruler therein must necessarily enjoy three elements of [jurisprudential] knowledge (Fiqāhat), justice (Idālat), and competence (Kifāyat). This is not only inferred from the nature of Islamic State, but also has been stressed in many religious texts.
7. The principle of non-negligence of the Legislator (Qā’idi-ye Lutf meaning “the rule of [divine] grace”). It is impossible for the Devine Legislator to be indifferent toward an essential and most important issue of the qualified leadership and government of the Islamic society, leaving the destiny of the Muslim community indeterminate.
8. Result. God has necessarily chosen the “just Muslim scholar” – competent of and qualified for leadership – as the leader of the community.
 

The Absolute Authority of the Muslim scholar
Question No. 12. What does the “absolute authority of the Muslim scholar” (“Wilāyat-e Mutlaqi-ye Faqīh) mean and how does it differ from the Muslim scholar’s Authority? How is the absolute authority of the Muslim scholar justified? Does it not culminate in autocracy and dictatorship?
“The Muslim scholar’s Authority” is a general terminology dividable into “absolute” and “conditioned”. Thus, “Wilāyat-e Mutlaqi-ye Faqīh” is conceptually one of the subcategories of “Wilāyat-e Faqīh”. Of course, what is nowadays meant by “Wilāyat-e Faqīh” is the very notion of “the absolute authority of the Muslim scholar”; the former not differing from the latter. The philosophy of this is clarified by explaining its meaning. Wilāyat-e Mutlaqi-ye Faqīh is used in two senses in Shiite jurisprudence:
1. Wilāyat-e Faqīh is not confined to the authority over judgment, the legally incompetent persons, etc. Rather it includes political and social leadership as well.
2. The jurisdiction of the “Walīy-e Amr” (the Authoritative Guardian) is not restricted to the enforcement of the primary and secondary decrees; in other words, his duty is the leadership of the society in a way that the common good of the society is well realized in the light of divine guidance so that the variety of society’s needs are fulfilled in different conditions, and the society is not prevented from growth and prosperity.
So, in case of special conditions wherein the common good and the needs of the society are in conflict with one of the primary decrees, the Authoritative Muslim scholar should weigh them against one another. If the issue in conflict with the primary decree is of grater benefit for the society, he can declare a temporary recess for that primary decree, giving priority to the issue in hand.
Surely, the absolute authority is itself conditioned by some restrictions, and is not absolute from all aspects. These restrictions are as follows:
1. He must be the enforcer of divine decrees and has no right to act arbitrarily. This is the main philosophy of the Muslim scholar’s Authority.
2. He must consider the expediency of the community.
3. He can declare a temporary recess for the primary decrees just when they are in conflict with a more important issue; he can not do this arbitrarily or for personal expediency or an issue lower in rank than the primary decrees.
Now if we look realistically, we will find that the “absolute authority of Muslim scholar” – in the aforementioned sense – is one of the most important solutions predicted by Islam as a way out of dead-ends in case of emergence of conflicts in social interests, without which the government would face many problems. The scholar Murteza Mutahhari held these prerogatives to be a means of empowering the Islamic society, knowing this as one of the mysteries of eternality of Islam.87 On the other hand, that much jurisdiction is available in any government and even the rulers in other states enjoy much more prerogatives than the Authoritative Muslim scholar.88
Considering what has been stated so far, it is quite clear that “being absolute” in the sense mentioned has nothing to do with “dictatorship and autocracy”. What has caused ambiguity here is the literal similarity between the “absolute” authority of Muslim scholar and “absolutist” regimes wherein the ruler is quite wayward. The term “absolute” in the above-mentioned sense is basically different. Accordingly, Imam Khomeini has insisted that “Wilāyat-e Faqīh is opposed to dictatorship”.89
 

The role of the Muslim scholars
Question No. 13. How far is the scope of the Muslim scholars’ function in Islamic State? In case of conflicts between Muslim scholars’ views with that of the rulers, which one has priority over the other one?
A) The Muslim scholars play the prime role in some parts of the government – which are the places for accommodating the political and social behaviors of the state with religious standards. Besides, the leadership of the Islamic regime in the Occultation period is the responsibility of a just, qualified and knowledgeable Muslim scholar who is competent of social management in the macro-level.
B) In case of conflict between the Muslim scholars’ view and that of the rulers, some points should be taken into consideration:
1. Who are meant by the rulers?
2. What is the subject of the conflict?
If by “rulers” we mean all those involved in the government, then we cannot give all of these views priority over the Muslim scholar’s view90, especially if all Muslim scholars are unanimous in holding those views to be against divine law. But if it is something in the personal jurisdiction of that agent and it is not held as a view against law by all Muslim scholars, then the opposing Muslim scholar’s view is not necessarily preferred.
3. If by “rulers” we mean the “Authoritative Muslim scholar”, his verdict is certainly prior to that of all other Muslim scholars. All Muslim scholars are unanimous in holding that opposing the “Authoritative Muslim scholar” in governmental issues is not permissible.
Of course, it must be noted that the priority of Walīy-e Amr’s view is in effect just in governmental verdicts. As for other issues, any Muslim scholar acts according to his own inference, and his imitators (“muqallids”) follow his expert opinion (“fatwā”).
4. In some cases, the Muslim scholars’ views are legally valid; such as cases where the Guardian Council91 should verify the legitimacy of something. In this case, if the Council – within the realm of its legal duties – declares something as illegitimate, its view must be accepted; unless the Expediency Discernment Council of the System verifies it, in which case it would be preponderant according to the authoritative rule.92
 

Governmental prerogatives
Question No. 14. What is the difference between the divine rulers’ prerogatives in Islamic State and those of the Prophet and Infallible Imams?
Considering governmental prerogatives, there is no difference between the Prophet, Imams, and the Authoritative Muslim scholar; for by the governmental prerogatives, we mean the essential social issues without which the government would not enjoy the necessary power to further its goal, i.e. providing the prosperity and the common good of the society. By “absolute authority”, we mean no more than this. Of course the Prophet and Imams had other states and prerogatives as well, reserved for them. These, however, had nothing to do with governmental issues. The Prophet, for instance, had the right to interfere in the personal affairs of the individuals; but the Authoritative Muslim scholar has no such a right, for this is an issue outside the scope of social and governmental issues.
The governmental prerogatives of the Impeccable
Imam Khomeini says on this subject:
These are wrong illusions to think the Prophet’s governmental prerogatives were more than Amir a-Muminīn, or whether the latter’s prerogatives are more than a Muslim scholar. Of course, the Holy Prophet’s virtues and eminences are more than the whole universe, as is Amir al-Muminīn’s virtues after the Prophet; but having more spiritual eminences does not mean to have more governmental prerogatives. The same authority and prerogatives enjoyed by the Prophet and other Imams in summoning and mobilizing the army, appointing the governors, collecting taxes and expending it for Muslims’ common good, have been accorded to the Authoritative Muslim scholar by God. Nonetheless, no specific person is determined. The general title of a “just religious scholar” has been stated.93
In explaining the abovementioned issue, Imam Khomeini stresses the difference between “the genitive positions” and “the trusted positions”. “Wilāyat”, as far as it means leadership and governance, is a trusted position conferred by the Legislator to the qualified persons. Here, there is no difference between the Prophet, Imams and the Authoritative Muslim scholar. The difference is in the realm of genitive authority and the true spiritual positions. Thus Imam Khomeini says:
For Imam, there is spiritual positions as well, separated from governmental duties; that is the status of divine vicegerency sometimes referred to by Imams themselves; this is a genitive vicegerency thereby all worldly elements are humble to the “Authoritative Guardian”.
Elsewhere, he says:
[The Muslim scholar’s Authority] is of trusted logical affairs and there is no reality for it except nomination…. In these affairs, it is not logical to think of a difference between the Prophet and Imams and the Muslim scholar.94

Legislation
Jurisprudence and Legislation
Question No. 15. Is jurisprudence enough for legislation in Islamic State? Or does it need the results of empirical and political sciences and other experiences of human societies?
The sufficiency of jurisprudence in legislation never means that we do not require the results obtained from empirical and political sciences. Thus in many cases we may consider various findings and experiences and pick out the most appropriate one, which is consistent with the jurisprudential norms. Jurisprudence is, therefore, sufficient on one hand; for the main function of jurisprudence is setting norms and it has enough resources in this realm. On the other hand, setting norms by jurisprudence is taken place on external subjects and, as we will see, recognizing existing subjects, creating new subjects, transforming subjects, and finding new ways in applying jurisprudential norms are all done through human sciences and experiences.95
 

Praxis and Legislation
Question No. 16. What is the role of praxis, culture, and customs in legislation in Islamic State?
To know the role of “praxis” in Islamic jurisprudence and law and in legislation of Islamic State, we need to have a definition of “praxis” and its various types, the criterion for its validity, its limits and conditions.
Definition of praxis:
Different definitions have been presented for “praxis” (“Urf”). One of them is as follows: “Praxis is what people have conventionalized it and behaved according to it; whether it is speech or action, doing something or refraining from doing it, and it is also called “habit” (‘ādat’)”.96
There are, however, some differences between “habit” and “praxis”; 97 it would be getting off the subject to discuss them here. The following parameters and elements have basic roles in emergence of “praxis”:
1. certainty of the practice (including speech, action, doing and refraining);
2. repetition of the practice;
3. generality;
4. intentionality, and not being innate.
Types of praxis:
“Praxis” is of various types, including general and particular praxis; sound and unsound praxis; the praxis based on needs and free from needs; imperative praxis; literal praxis and practical praxis, and so on. Elaborating investigation of all these types is not within the scope of this book, and the reader should refer to the related sources.98
The status of “praxis” in the Islamic jurisprudence and law
The sources for finding out and inferring religious decrees and laws in Islam are divided into two types:
1. Primary sources: By primary sources, it is meant the sources which are either intrinsically valid such as “reason”, or the Legislator has directly made them valid such as “the Book” (i.e Quran) and “Sunna” (i.e. the Prophet’s sayings and actions, or those of his Companions).
2. Secondary sources: These are the sources whose validity is consequential, relying on one of the primary sources; such as Ijmā’ (unanimity of the Muslim scholars), Shuhrat (relative agreement), the Muslims’ way of life, the intellectuals’ practice (praxis). On the authority of praxis or the criterion for its validity, all Muslim scholars agree that it is not valid on its own; rather, its validity is dependant on something else. As to the basis of this validity, there are again two different views:
First. Some believe that praxis is dependant on Sunna; in that case, what is authentic is the Legislator’s view. Therefore, praxis is “valid” when it is endorsed by the Legislator. As to the general praxis – which has been beheld by the Legislator – His silence and lack of opposition is enough. Praxis or the intellectuals’ practice is thus valid and adducible only if it is not opposed – directly or indirectly – by the Legislator.99
Second. Some believe that praxis is dependant on reason. Thus, based on the principle of concomitance between the precepts of “reason” and those of “divine law”, praxis enjoys validity and authority as well.
Now we are not seeking to judge on the values of the two abovementioned concepts or to state the differences between them. Besides, we cannot enumerate – based on any of the two aforementioned approaches – all the conditions of the validity of praxis here. The common points of these two views are as follows:
1. Praxis or the intellectuals’ practice altogether enjoys validity and authority;
2. The validity of praxis is not intrinsic; rather it depends on the other sources. Thus the rules and scope of its validity and importance is subject to its primary source;
3. If some praxis is opposed to the decrees of reason or divine law, it would be quite invalid, and cannot be adduced.
Therefore, in legislation of the Islamic society we may adduce the praxis; this, however, is under some rules and limitations discussed in detailed jurisprudential and legal sources. Some of the cases where we can apply praxis as a criterion follow:
First. Denotations of words, phrases and conceptions. In other words, to find out the notions intended by the Legislator, the words and statements containing legal and jurisprudential decrees are the main source for understanding the praxis.
Some principles and rules in the religious language have been resulted from this reality, called literal principles and rules. The most important ones are Isālat al-zuhūr (the principle of appearance), Isālat al-umūm (the principle of generality), Isālat al-itlāq (the principle of application), Isālat al-haqīqa (the principle of truth).
Second. In judicial laws and procedures, praxis is used as an adducible source and it is – along with the principle of absence – one of the methods for distinguishing between complainant and denier.100
Third. As for the provisions of contracts, praxis is used as an adducible legal source. The Muslim scholars hold that the provisions stipulated usually in contracts are valid as the basic provisions of the contracts.
Fourth. Recognizing the instances of the secondary topics (such as necessity, the degree of importance, loss, impediment, etc.) provides a wide chance for the role of praxis in legislation.
Fifth. Some of the jurisprudential decrees are based on praxis. The ratified decrees of Islam – including many legal, social and economic relations – form a wide arena of acceptance and ratification of praxis in jurisprudence and legislation of the Islamic society; for instance, the validity of the mutual granting contract, unauthorized contract, a passerby’s use of the perishable fruits under the trees without the consent of the owner, and so on.
Sixth. Praxis is considered as the source for interpreting the instances of the decrees, and in some cases, appurtenances and the subject of the decree and its elements and requirements. The professor Amid Zanjani writes:
“Praxis affects thus the decree itself indirectly through the interpretation it provides for the subject or appurtenance of the precept, and sometimes it changes the decrees; such as the impermissibility of the assimilation to infidels which was true some day by putting on special western clothes. But since those clothes are no longer specific to westerners, becoming popular common clothes in according to praxis, the related decree is no longer true in that case”.
Such an influence does not imply any change in the decree, but it denotes a change in the subject or the instance, whose source is the praxis.
Seventh. In the level of international relations and laws, customs and praxes formed gradually in human societies and felt to be necessary – if there are no religious prohibitions for them – are valid.
Eighth. In all political and governmental issues, praxis is valid as a legal source. Of course, as we said before, conventional validity is under some conditions. These conditions are divided into two groups:
1. Thematic condition; that is the conditions thereby the praxis is proved. Here, some believe in two essential conditions: “continuous repetition” and “being obligatory”.101
2. Perceptive condition; that is lack of any prohibitions or oppositions by the Legislator. These two conditions are agreed upon by all Muslim scholars. Some scholars have stated, according to their own personal views, some other conditions for validity of praxis, which cannot be dealt with here.
Secular Praxis
Another point which is worth mentioning here is the existence of two views on “praxis”: one is “religious praxis” and the other is “secular or laic praxis”. In the former, the “praxis” is considered along with religion and used as one of the sources related to religious law. What was stated before is generally related to this kind of “praxis”.
In the latter view, “praxis” is primarily considered independently; that is the major questions are the followings:
1. Can we use “praxis” as an independent source for legislation along with the Book and Sunna?
2. Here, by “praxis” the merely mean rational aspect of it is not meant; in other words, we do not intend to say since intellectuals are the individuals who enjoy reason, intelligence and insight, they should be used as a source for legislation. Rather, as said before, intellectuals enjoy two aspects; one is the rational-cognitive aspect, and the other is the aspect of feelings and desires. Now the following question is raised: “Can we consider the desires and wishes pertaining to the ‘praxis’ in the process of legislation?” In other words if in some cases the “praxis” whishes something according to the wishes of the carnal soul, can it be legally validated? In view of the two points mentioned here, the question can be paraphrased as “Can we consider the people’s desires as an independent source for legislation in Islamic State along with the Book and Sunna?”
To answer this question, it should be noted that the ritual decrees of religion can be divided into five groups: Obligatory (Vājib), Recommended (Mustahab), Permitted (Mubāh), Disapproved (Makrūh), and Prohibited (Harām).
A. The obligatory and the prohibited things are the essential religious decrees whose violation is regarded as sin. Imam Ali (PBUH) says: “No creature deserves obedience when God is to be disobeyed”102; whether that creature is a sovereign or it is a public wish. So nobody has the right to change these affairs arbitrarily and act against them or to want someone else to act against them. Accordingly, the mere public desire – without the existence of a secondary emergency case or a more important social interest – cannot be the source of legislation against essential religious decrees; rather, the public interference in such affairs is contrary to the essential philosophy of Islamic State and leads to its secularization, because the Islamic State is a system based on divine laws and the divine laws, in turn, are based on real expediencies of human society, not merely on whims and desires. If the public wish is to be considered along with divine laws or precede them, there are no difference between Islamic State and the laic or non-religious ones.
B. The recommended, permitted and disapproved things are in the scope of unessential decrees. In this sphere, the Legislator has authorized the believers to decide according to their own will, choosing a favorite item among various options available. The difference is that for “recommended” things it is preferable to do them, while for “disapproved” things it is preferable to avoid them. As for the “permitted” things, the Legislator has preferred none of them. Thus preferring each of them is accredited to the individuals. Here, the individual’s desires and favorites can be effective in decision-makings in major social issues and be used as a source for legislation.

Jurisprudential and Scientific Management
Question No. 17. What is the role of management in Islamic State? What is the role of jurisprudential and scientific managements in Islamic State? Which one plays a greater role?
Needles to say, no government and system can be originated without management. Management plays an essential and very crucial role in any government. Most importantly, all managers and planners in various spheres – while using the best and the most efficient methods – must always protect religious values and apply religious norms along with scientific innovations.
To clarify this point, it should be noted that every society has its own ideals, goals and values. These ideals and values are not defined in the sphere of science; they are beyond the scope of science. On the other hand, science can teach men the methods of achieving goals and ideals. So, none of the following questions may be answered by science: “what ideals should be picked out?” “Should we consider human felicity in this world and in the hereafter as our ideal, or just in this world?” “Should we set as our goal the man’s perfection and uplift, or his pleasures and material enjoyment?” “Should we seek to establish justice in the society or just individual freedom?” None of these questions are scientific ones; however, the solution in each case can be learnt through human knowledge. On the other hand, if we choose “the good of the two world” and set human’s “perfection and elevation” as our goal, it is quite natural that we need meta-scientific sources – such as revelational knowledge – to achieve them and more values to regulate relations in this and the other world. Nevertheless, science also shows us some methods in this regard; but choosing the methods offered by science should be consistent with the values and principles accepted in religion. Both religious and secular governments, thus, receive their ideals from outside the realm of science, and both can benefit from human knowledge in selecting the methods; however, the selection of methods would be consistent with the ideals and goals of the “value system”. Altogether, we can conclude that there is no contradiction between scientific and religious management; rather, the contradiction is found between the secular and religious systems of management. The reason for this contradiction is that secular management accepts no superhuman source, but religious management relies on revelation and divine instructions.103

The Role of Achievement & Science
Question No. 18. What is the role of human achievements, scientific and social laws in Islamic State?
Human’s scientific achievements are of different types:
First. Recognizing the subject: the subjects of religious laws and decrees are of various types: some are simple and clear and others are complicated and need accurate expertise. Human sciences are highly efficient in recognizing the subjects of such decrees. On the other hand, “recognizing the subjects” is an essential stage in recognizing the instances of secondary and governmental decrees, and human sciences are highly needed in this respect.
Second. Converting the subject: human sciences sometimes convert the subject of a religious decree, and thereby change the decreee itself. Human’s access to the science of “blood transfusion” causes the blood to come out of the classification of ritually impure things which lack any permissible benefits, falling into the category of the items with permissible benefits. With this change, a new item for economic exchanges is generated and its exchange is made legal.
Third. Creating the subject: the development of human knowledge always creates new subjects for Islamic jurisprudence. Human ability in artificial conception, for instance, creates a new subject in the system of family law, calling for inferring and enacting related laws.
Fourth. Recognizing the method: many of the social laws and decrees of religion are executable in different ways. Human knowledge is much beneficial for discovering better methods which are consistent with needs and demands of the time. The role of the human knowledge in legislation is, thus, one of the appropriate methods in this regard.
 

Islam and Economics
Question No. 19. How much is the role of economics and new economic relations and laws acceptable in Islamic State? Are economic laws and relations effective in administrative methods of Islamic State?
To clarify this point, it is worth mentioning that “economics” states the general rules and principles governing the economic behavior of human beings, having in fact a “descriptive” nature not a “normative” one. It teaches us, for instance, that extra value is subject to the system of supply and demand. According to this rule, if supply exceeds demand, it leads to a reduction in prices; and if demand exceeds supply, it results in a rise in prices. This idea is stated as a reality in setting prices in economic terms. But the economics can not answer the question of whether we can refrain from supplying the goods needed by people or hoard them to increase the prices. It is the economic school that offers the answer.
Economic liberalism, based on commercialistic ideals and the doctrine of “laissez fair”, permits hoarding, while another economic school may reject it according to the ideal of justice. Therefore, Islamic State – like any other government – can make use of economics in economic planning, but accommodates the selected methods with religious norms, prescribing methods which are consistent with religious values.104
 

The Status of Reason
Question No. 20. What is the status of reason in Islamic State?
“Reason” enjoys a high status in Islamic thought and is one of the most important and essential sources for inferring religious laws and decrees. In other words, “reason” is not contrary to “religious law”, but it is one of the elements and pillars of “religious law”. Naturally, Islamic State must make use of “reason” in planning, legislation and administration.
It should be noted that it is definitive reason, and not speculative reason, that is regarded as one of the pillars of religious law. In administrative methods and practical issues of government, instrumental, speculative and empirical reasons (sciences) may also be used. Nevertheless, these kinds of rational instructions are used in cases wherein they are not in contradiction to religious instructions and high human values.105


1 Mā’ida(V) 44 (tr. Mohammad M. Pickthall).
2 For further information, see Muhammad-Javad Nawrouzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Islam; Andishey-e Hawza, 5th year, no. 1 & 2; Vizhe Namey-e Velayat-e Faqih, Razavi University of Islamic Sciences; Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porseshha va Pasokhha, I, pp. 45-7.
3 See Imam Khomeini, Ketāb al-Bay' , II, p. 461; Ali Rabbani-Golpayegani, Dīn va Dolat, p. 145.
4 See Sayyid Musa Mir-Mudarres, Jāme'ey-e Barin, p. 209-10.
5 The Quran, Hajj (XXII), 41.
6 Al-Majlisi (ed.), Bihār al-Anwār, II, 18.
7 Quran, Yusuf (XII), 40. See also An'am (VI), 57, 62; Yusuf (XII), 67.
8 Baqara (II), 124.
9 Māida (V), 50. See also Tīn (XCV), 8; A'rāf (VII), 87; Yūnis (X), 109; Naml (XXVII), 78; Shura (XLII), 10; An'ām (VI), 114.
10 Māida (V), 44; See also ibid., 45; ibid, 47.
11 Nisā (IV), 60. See also Baqara (II), 257.
12 Nisā (IV), 141. See also Āli Imrān (3), 100; ibid, 28; Māida (V), 51.
13 Sajda (XXXII), 18.
14 Hūd, 113.
15 Insān (LXXVI), 24.
16 Nisā (IV), 5.
17 Shu'arā (XXVI), 151-2.
18 Kahf (XVIII), 28.
19 Muhammad (XLVII), 14.
20 Zumar (XXXIX), 9.
21 Nūr (XXIV), 54.
22 Baqara (II), 247.
23 Yūsuf (XII), 55.
24 Nahl (XVI), 76.
25 An'ām (VI), 50.
26 Yūnis (X), 35.
27 Sajda (XXXII), 18.
28 For further information, see Ja'far Subhani, Ma'ālim al-hukūmat al-Islāmiya.
29 Muhammad Hassan Qadrdan Qaramaleki, Taqābul-i mashyi-e a'imma bā secūlārsm, Ma'rifat Magazine, no. 19.
30 See: John Locke, A letter concerning tradition, ed. P. Romanell, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955); see also a review of this book by Sayyid Ali Mahmoudi, Edālat va Āzādī, pp. 79-99.
31 H.A.R. Gibb, Religion, politics and Islam, tr. Mahdi Qayeni, p. 26-7.
32 For further information, see: Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, tr. Afshar Amiri, p. 17-33; Jean-Paul Willaime, Sociologie des Religions, tr. Abdu-Rahim Govahi.
33 Āl-e Imrān (III), 164.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Nahl (XVI), 36.
37 Ibid.
38 Hadid (LVII), 25.
39 Baqara (II), 214; Nisā (IV), 105.
40 A'rāf (VII), 157.
41 Ibid.
42 Murteza Mutahhari, pīrāmūn-e Inqilāb-e Islamī, p. 128, Qom, Sadra Publications 1369.
43 Hadid (LVII), 25.
44 Mutahhari, op. cit.
45 Nahj al-Balāgha, Sermon no. 33.
46 Muhammad Muhammadi Rey Shahri, Muntakhab-e Mīzān al-kikma (tr.), I, p. 364, Qom, Dar alHadīth publications, 1381.
47 Ibid.
48 Nahj al-Balāgha, Sermon no. 40.
49 For further information, see Rasul Ja’fariyan, Sīriy-e sīyasī-e Imāmān-e Shīa; and also Mahdi Pishvaie, Sīmāy-e Pīshvāyān.
50 Many proofs attest to this fact, including people of Medina’s not responding to Imam Ali’s call for allegiance after the Prophet’s departure, Imam Hassan’s army’s refusal to fight Mu’awia, people of Kufa’s breaking with Imam Hussein and killing him.
51 Bihār al-anwār, xxix, p. 419; Tabarsi, al-Ihtijāj, p.75.
52 For further information, see Usūl-e Kāfī, i, Kitāb al-Hujja.
53 See: Allama Amini, al-Qadīr,i, p. 159-213: al-munāshida va-l-ihtijāj bi-hadīth al-Qadīr, Dār al-Kitāb al-Arabi, Beirut 1387/ 1968.
54 Nahj al-Balāgha, Sermon no. 2.
55 ibid.
56 ibid, Sermon no. 3.
57 For further information, see Question no. 30.
58 For further information, see Mahdi Pishvaie, Sīmāy-e pīshvāyān dar āyiniy-e tārīkh, pp. 27-38, Qom: Dar al-Ilm, 1st ed. 1375; see also idem, Sīriy-e pīshvayān, pp. 92-140, Qom: Tawhid Publications, 13th ed. 1381.
59 For further information, see ibid, p.109-11; and also idem, Sīriy-e pīshvayān, pp. 382-410.
60 For further information, see Murteza Mutahhari, seirī dar sīrey-e a’immay-e athār, p. 194-216, Qom, Sadra Publications, 11th ed. 1374; see also Muhammad Hassan Qadrdan Qaramaleki, Taqābul-i mashyi-e a'imma bā secūlārsm, Ma'rifat Magazine, no. 39.
61 Baqara (II), 124.
62 Muntakhab-e kanz al-ummāl, v, 321; Tārīkh-e ibn-e kathīr, vi, 249; Suyūtī’s tārīkh al-khulafā,10; kanz al-ummāl, xiii, 26; al-savā’q al-muhriqa, 28.
63 Nadavi, sharh-e sahīh-e Muslim, xii, 202; al-savā’q al-muhriqa, 18; Suyūtī’s tārīkh al-khulafā,10.
64 Farā’d al-samtain, 1164. for furthr information, see: Allama Sayyid Murteza Askari, imāmān-e īn ummat davāzdah (12) nafarand.
65 This sense of “minimal” is different from its sense in political sciences. In this sense, all these regimes are considered minimal, for “being minimal” means paying attention exclusively to this world, which is the common feature of all non-Islamic States.
66 Nahl (XVI), 36.
67 Jum’a (LXII), 2.
68 A’rāf (VII), 157.
69 Hadid (LVII), 25.
70 Quran, Hajj (XXII), 41.
71 mutadrak al-vasā’il, xvii, 315, bāb 11.
72 Nahj al-Balāgha, aphorism no. 73.
73 Bihār al-anwār, ciii, 7.
74 Gospel of John 19:36.
75 Gospel of Luke 20:25.
76 For further information, see Sayyid Ahmad Rahnamaie, Gharb shināsī, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, 1st ed. 1379; H.A.R. Gibb, Religion, politics and Islam, tr. Mahdi Qayeni.
77 Muhammad Ismail Khodadadi, Mabānī ilm-e sīyāsat, p.54, Qom: Yaqut publication, 1st ed. 1380.
78 Ali Abdul-razzaq, al-islām va usūl al-hukm, p.103 quoted from Muhammad Soroush, Dīn va dolat dar andīshiy-e Islāmī, p.139, The Office for Islamic Propaganda of Qom Seminary, 1st ed., 1378.
79 See: Abd al-Rahman Alim, Bunyā hāy-e ilm-e sīyāsat, p.168, Tehran, Ney Publications, 2nd ed. 1375.
80 Shu’arā (XXVI), 151-2.
81 Safar b. Abd al-Rahman al-havali, al-Ilmānīya; Will Durant, The Story of Civilization, iv, The Age of Faith, ch. 27; Dr. Ali Reza Rahimi Boroujerdi, Seyr-e tahavūl-e tafakkur-e jadīd dar urūpā.
82 Payām-e zan Periodical, 5th year, no. 1 (Farvardin 75).
83 For further information, see Muhammad Hassan Qadrdan Qaramaleki, Secularism dar masīhīyat va Islam; Falsafay-e sīyāsat, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute; Imam Khomeini, Wilāyat-e Faqīh, Institution for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s works.
84 “inna ahaqqa al-nās bi hāza al-amr aqvāhum a’layhi va a\lamuhum bi amr Allah fīh”, Nahj al-Balāgha. Sermon no.173. For further information, see Muhammad Hadi ma’rifat, Wilāyat-e Faqīhi, p.165.
85 For further information, see Abdullah Nasri, Intizar-e basher az dīn; Ali Rabbani Golpayigani, Jāmi’īyyat va kamāl-e dīn.
86 Usūl-e Kāfī, i, p.58.
87 For further information, see Murteza Mutahhri, Khatm-e Nubuwwat, p.64-5, Qom, Sadra Pulications, 9th ed. 1374.
88 For further information, see Hussein Javan Araste, Mabāniīy-e hukūmat-e dīnīi, p.35-8.
89 Sahīfiy-e nūr, x, 306.
90 Here we mean the jurist without any legal and formal position in the Islamic State.
91 The council within IRI regime, consisting of 6 Muslim scholars and 6 jurists, whose responsibility – inter alia – is to investigate the conformity of any enacted law to the Islamic principles.
92 For further information, see Muhammad Hadi Ma’rifat, Jami’iy-e madanī, p.163; Muhammad Hussein Mahuri, Marja’īyyat va rahbari(the article on Islamic government), 5th year, issue no. 2; Kazim Qazizade, andīshihāy-e fiqhī va sīyāsī-e Imam Khomeini, p.222.
93 Imam Khomeini, Wilāyat-e Faqīh, p.40, 7th ed. 1377.
94 Imam Khomeini, Wilāyat-e Faqīh, p.41.
95 For further information, see Ahmad Va’izi, Hukūmat-e dīnī, p.91-101; also Mahdi Hadavi Tehrani, wilāyat va dīyānat, p.46-7; idem, Bāvarhā va porseshhā, p.103-11; ibid, questions no. 22-24.
96 Khalil Reza Mansouri, dirāsat al-mozū’iyya hawl nazariyyat al-urf va dawrihā fī amaliyyat al-istinbāt, p.51.
97 Ibid, p.52-4; Abul Hassan Muhammadi, mabānī istinbāt-e huqūq-e islāmī yā usūl-e fiqh, p.251.
98 For further information, see Sayyid Ali Jabbar Golbaghi Masule, Dar āmadī bar urf.
99 In this regard, some provisions have been stated and there are disagreements on some qualities whose elaborate investigation is impossible here.
100 For further information, see Abbas Ali Amid Zanjani, Fiqh-e sīyāsī-e Islam, ii, p.219; also Sharh al-lum’at al-damishqīyya, v, p.376.
101 ibid, p.223.
102 Nahj al-Balāgha, Wisdom no.165.
103 For further information, see Hamid Reza Shakerin, Secularism, discussion on jurisprudential and scientific managements.
104 For further information, see Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Sadr, Iqtisād-e mā, i and ii.
105 For further information, see Hamid Reza Shakerin, Secularism (discussion on jurisprudential and scientific managements); Sayf Allah Sarami, the article entitled “Aql-e qat’ī manba’-e istinbāt-e qavānīn-e jāmi’i va hukūmat-e Islāmī”, Hukūmat-e Islāmī magazine, no.20, 6th year, 2nd issue, Summer 1380.
4 / ISLAMIC STATE
INDEX / V
68 / ISLAMIC STATE
THE DEFINITION OF ISLAMIC STATE / 3
THE NECESSITY AND THE GOAL OF ISLAMIC STATE / 7
SOCIETY AND ISLAMIC STATE / 11
PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS OF “ISLAMIC STATE” / 23
PHASES, VARIETIES AND STRUCTURE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE / 27
THE ADVANTAGES OF ISLAMIC STATE / 33
THE MUSLIM SCHOLAR’S AUTHORITY (WILĀYAT-E FAQĪH) / 51
LEGISLATION / 63
JURISPRUDENTIAL AND SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT / 69
BIBLIOGRAPHY / 137


 

 

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